Security pack
ASVS level 2 self-assessment
Version 1.0, November 2026 · The whole pack · PDF
Hosted IMS Creator (app.imscreator.com, Stage A) against the Application Security
Verification Standard, level 2, as at go-live. Met: in place, with evidence (a test, code or a
setting). Partial: in place with a stated limit. Gap: not yet, with the plan. Chapters and
requirement numbers are ASVS 4.0.3's. Reviewed by: the owner, before go-live; again before Stage B
and after any major change. The independent penetration test (before Stage B or a third customer)
checks this assessment.
Summary
| Chapter |
Status |
The main points |
| V1 Architecture |
Met |
Documented design and threat model (CLOUD-ARCHITECTURE.md); tenancy enforced in one place (the host); isolation proven by tests on every build |
| V2 Authentication |
Met |
NIST 800-63B passwords, breached-password check, Argon2id, TOTP before the password, recovery codes, lockouts, emailed single-use resets |
| V3 Sessions |
Met |
Server-side sessions, 12 h idle / 7 days, revocable, ended on password, role and MFA changes; __Host- HttpOnly Secure SameSite=Strict cookie |
| V4 Access control |
Met |
Deny by default; company from the session only; roles checked per request; operators reach no company content (tests) |
| V5 Validation and encoding |
Met |
Pydantic models and typed routes; parameterised SQL (SQLAlchemy); React escaping; paths and uploads checked |
| V6 Cryptography |
Partial |
Standard libraries only (Argon2id, Fernet/AES, HMAC-SHA256); per-site and per-company keys, rotatable; master-key wrapping comes with Stage B |
| V7 Errors and logging |
Partial |
Audit log per company, hash-chained, exportable; no secrets or content in logs; central log shipping is a Stage B item |
| V8 Data protection |
Met |
No drawings kept; Claude keys sealed, never shown; caching off for the app shell; backups encrypted client-side |
| V9 Communications |
Met |
TLS 1.2+ at Cloudflare, HSTS, tunnel encrypted; internal services on the Docker network only |
| V10 Malicious code |
Partial |
Dependencies pinned and scanned (Trivy, pip-audit); production updates itself only to images its own CI built, tested and scanned, pinned by commit, with rollback; ClamAV on uploads when built in; code signing of images, and branch protection as the gate to production, are Stage B items |
| V11 Business logic |
Met |
Rate limits on sign-in steps; last-admin and break-glass protections; Claude spend alerts; batches limited in size and time |
| V12 Files and resources |
Met |
Uploads by content type, size and zip checks, outside the web root, deleted within 2 hours; downloads by id, path-checked |
| V13 API |
Met |
JSON API with CSRF header requirement, typed schemas, 413 above 110 MB, no API docs exposed on the host |
| V14 Configuration |
Partial |
Security headers and CSP; secrets in .env (mode 600); containers drop capabilities; containers still run as root |
V1 Architecture, design and threat modelling
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 1.1.1-1.1.7 Secure development, threat model, components documented |
Met |
docs/CLOUD-ARCHITECTURE.md (sections 4, 5, 11, 12: components, tenancy, controls, threat model); this assessment |
| 1.2 Authentication architecture |
Met |
One sign-in path (readiness/web/host.py); low-privilege database use per company database; operators separate from people |
| 1.4 Access control architecture |
Met |
The host checks session, company, site and role before any site API; enforced in one place, not per route; tests/test_isolation.py |
| 1.5 Input and output architecture |
Met |
Serialisation through Pydantic/JSON only; no deserialisation of untrusted objects |
| 1.6 Cryptographic architecture |
Partial |
Keys per site and per company (rotate-keys); a master key (KMS) wrapping them is Stage B |
| 1.8 Data protection |
Met |
Data classification (CLOUD-ARCHITECTURE.md 9.1); drawings not stored |
| 1.9 Communications |
Met |
All external traffic through the Cloudflare tunnel; Postgres and MinIO not published |
| 1.12-1.14 Uploads, configuration |
Met |
Separate temporary batch volume, excluded from backups; pinned images; deploy runbook |
V2 Authentication
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 2.1.1-2.1.12 Password security |
Met |
12-256 characters, any characters, no composition rules or expiry, breached-password check at setting (k-anonymity), paste allowed, change requires the current password (identity.password_problem, tests in test_signin.py) |
| 2.2.1 Anti-automation |
Met |
5 wrong codes: 15-minute lock; 10 wrong passwords: 1-hour lock; per-address limit (60 per 5 minutes); Cloudflare rate limits |
| 2.2.2-2.2.3 Notify of authentication events |
Met |
Locks, authenticator resets and break-glass use are emailed |
| 2.3 Authenticator lifecycle |
Met |
Invitations and resets by single-use, expiring links (7 days, 1 hour); no temporary passwords on the hosted service |
| 2.4.1-2.4.5 Credential storage |
Met |
Argon2id (argon2-cffi defaults); older scrypt hashes rehashed at sign-in |
| 2.5 Credential recovery |
Met |
Emailed reset link only; ends every session; does not bypass the authenticator |
| 2.7-2.8 Out-of-band and one-time codes |
Met |
TOTP (RFC 6238), each code once (mfa_last_step), 10 hashed single-use recovery codes, secrets sealed with the company's key |
| 2.10 Service authentication |
Met |
No default or shared service accounts in the app; database and store credentials only in .env |
V3 Session management
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 3.2.1-3.2.3 Session binding |
Met |
256-bit random session ids, only their hash stored; new id at each sign-in; cookie value signed |
| 3.3.1-3.3.4 Logout and timeout |
Met |
Sign-out revokes server-side; 12 h idle, 7 days absolute; list and end other sessions; password change ends the others |
| 3.4.1-3.4.5 Cookies |
Met |
__Host- prefix, Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/ (test_hardening.py) |
| 3.5 Token-based sessions |
n/a |
Not used |
| 3.7.1 Re-authentication before sensitive changes |
Partial |
A password change needs the current password, removing an authenticator needs a code; other admin actions rely on the session (acceptable at 12 h idle; to revisit) |
V4 Access control
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 4.1.1-4.1.5 General |
Met |
Deny by default (401/403 before any site route); the company is the session's, never a request's |
| 4.2.1 IDOR |
Met |
Every GET route swept with the other company's names and ids (test_isolation.py, 70 routes, 200+ requests) |
| 4.2.2 CSRF |
Met |
SameSite=Strict plus the X-ORT-Request header on every state-changing request (test_signin.py) |
| 4.3.1 Admin interfaces |
Met |
Platform administration requires an administrator with an authenticator; from the internet only through Cloudflare Access as that administrator (its signed token checked on every request); reaches no company's site |
| 4.3.2 Directory browsing |
Met |
No listings served; static assets by name only |
V5 Validation, sanitisation and encoding
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 5.1 Input validation |
Met |
Pydantic models for settings; typed parameters; allow-lists for roles, regions, providers, kinds |
| 5.2 Sanitisation |
Met |
File and path names cleaned (insider._safe, localfolder.rel, storage._check) |
| 5.3 Output encoding |
Met |
React escapes by default; the two raw HTML insertions are the app's own help pages (from its Markdown) and the QR SVG it generates |
| 5.3.4 SQL injection |
Met |
SQLAlchemy throughout; the few textual statements use bound parameters or fixed identifiers |
| 5.3.8 OS command injection |
Met |
Subprocesses take argument lists, never a shell string |
| 5.5 Deserialisation |
Met |
JSON and YAML safe_load only |
V6 Stored cryptography
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 6.1 Data classification |
Met |
CLOUD-ARCHITECTURE.md 9.1 |
| 6.2.1-6.2.6 Algorithms |
Met |
Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256), Argon2id, SHA-256, HMAC-SHA256; no home-made crypto (TOTP per RFC 6238 with HMAC-SHA1, as the RFC) |
| 6.3 Random values |
Met |
secrets / os.urandom for ids, tokens, keys |
| 6.4.1-6.4.2 Key management |
Partial |
Keys per site and company, rotatable (rotate-keys, runbook); keys are files on the encrypted disk, not in a vault: KMS in Stage B |
V7 Error handling and logging
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 7.1.1-7.1.4 Log content |
Met |
No passwords, codes, tokens or Claude keys logged; drawing content not logged |
| 7.2 Security events |
Met |
Company audit log: sign-ins and failures with address, locks, roles, invitations, MFA, domains, Claude connections, key rotation, exports, break-glass |
| 7.3.1-7.3.4 Log protection |
Partial |
Audit entries hash-chained (tampering shown on Company, test_hardening.py), exportable as CSV; application logs stay on the VM (capped); central shipping in Stage B |
| 7.4 Error handling |
Met |
Generic messages to users; no stack traces in responses |
V8 Data protection
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 8.1 General |
Met |
Drawings never stored (batches deleted within 2 hours, excluded from backups); per-company databases and bucket prefixes |
| 8.2 Client-side |
Met |
No sensitive data in local storage (only the theme, and folder handles in IndexedDB); Cache-Control: no-cache on the app shell |
| 8.3 Sensitive private data |
Met |
Claude keys never shown after saving; operators see counts, not content; export and deletion runbooks |
V9 Communications
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 9.1 Client communications |
Met |
TLS 1.2+ (Cloudflare), HSTS (12 months), always HTTPS |
| 9.2 Server communications |
Met |
Tunnel encrypted; Claude, Postmark, DNS-over-HTTPS and breach-check calls over TLS with verification; internal traffic on the private Docker network |
V10 Malicious code
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 10.2 Malicious code search |
Partial |
Reviewed by the owner; no remote code loading; automatic updates take only the repository's own CI-built images (whoever can push to the branch reaches production, so pushes are the owner's) |
| 10.3 Application integrity |
Partial |
Images built by CI from the repository, scanned (Trivy), pinned by commit; image signing in Stage B |
V11 Business logic
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 11.1.1-11.1.8 |
Met |
Steps in order (code before password, within 2 minutes); limits on sign-in, upload size and batch count; the last company admin and the break-glass account protected; Claude use alerts |
V12 Files and resources
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 12.1 Upload |
Met |
Size limits (500 MB a file, 110 MB a request); zip bombs refused (ratio, total, count); test_localfolder.py |
| 12.2 Integrity |
Met |
Type by content, matching the name; SHA-256 checked on arrival |
| 12.3 Execution |
Met |
Uploads never executed or served as-is; paths cannot leave the batch (rel, zip-slip check) |
| 12.4 Storage |
Met |
Outside the web root, on a separate volume |
| 12.5-12.6 Download and SSRF |
Met |
Downloads by id within the batch or store; no user-supplied URLs fetched by the server |
V13 API
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 13.1 General |
Met |
Same authentication and authorisation for every API route |
| 13.2 RESTful |
Met |
CSRF header on changes; JSON content type; methods per action; request size limit (413) |
V14 Configuration
| Req. |
Status |
Evidence |
| 14.1 Build and deploy |
Met |
CI builds, tests (incl. isolation on Postgres) and scans; deploy runbook with staging |
| 14.2 Dependencies |
Met |
Pinned, scanned in CI (Trivy, pip-audit) |
| 14.3 Unintended disclosure |
Met |
No server paths or versions of components in responses to companies; API docs not on the host |
| 14.4 HTTP security headers |
Met |
CSP (scripts by hash), X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, COOP, HSTS (test_hardening.py) |
| 14.5 Request validation |
Met |
Host header fixed by the tunnel; CORS not enabled |
| Container hardening (beyond ASVS) |
Partial |
no-new-privileges, all capabilities dropped, memory limits; still root inside, writable file systems: to change with a non-root image user |
Fixed for go-live
Found by this assessment and fixed before go-live (commit with this file):
- Security headers and a content security policy (V14.4) on the host and on a site of its own.
- The session cookie bound to the host on HTTPS (
__Host- prefix) (V3.4).
- Requests over 110 MB refused before they are read (V13.2).
- The company audit log hash-chained, its integrity shown, exportable (V7.3).
- Dependency auditing in CI (pip-audit) beside the image scan (V14.2).
- The restore drill automated on Postgres (
tests/test_restore.py).
- Earlier in the build: the drawing register's prompts no longer describe one company's drawings
as another's; the Claude key never falls back to the host's own; links not spent by a password
that is refused.
Open items
| Item |
Plan |
| Master key (KMS) wrapping company keys (V6.4) |
Stage B (Key Vault / KMS) |
| Central, tamper-resistant log shipping (V7.3) |
Stage B |
| Re-authentication before sensitive admin actions (V3.7) |
Next release: re-enter the password or a code for role changes to company admin, break-glass and Claude connection changes |
| Containers as a non-root user, read-only file systems |
Next release: an amtoolkit user in the image, folder ownership set by the init service |
| Image signing (V10.3) |
Stage B (cosign) |
| Per-company Postgres roles |
Before the third customer |
| Independent penetration test |
Before Stage B or a third customer |